CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶ 1 Defendant Jerry Cooper appeals his jury convictions for four counts of filing a wrongful lien. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-5(2) (2001) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-503 (2008)).
¶ 2 In 1997, Mary and Richard Pace purchased a sixty-three percent property interest in a certain parcel of property at a tax sale. Due to complications that arose in asserting their rights to the property, the Paces hired attorney Rodney Rivers, who conducted a title search that revealed several people with a potential interest in the property. Rivers then filed a quiet title action against Defendant and other potential owners. Judge Lynn Davis of the Fourth District Court ultimately decided the quiet title action in the Paces' favor in January 2004.
¶ 3 On November 15, 2004, Defendant's father, Richard Donald Cooper, recorded a document titled "Administrative Judgment" with the Utah County Recorder's Office at Defendant's request.
¶ 4 In July 2005, the State charged Defendant with four counts of filing a wrongful lien.
¶ 5 Defendant asserts that he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial when the trial court instructed the jury that the Administrative Judgment had been determined by another court to be a wrongful lien against Judge Davis. "The standard of review for jury instructions to which counsel has objected is correctness." State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct.App.1998).
State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, ¶ 10, 134 P.3d 1160 (additional internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd sub nom. State v. Austin, 2007 UT 55, ¶ 8, 165 P.3d 1191; see also State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 40, 82 P.3d 1106 ("[I]n most circumstances the term manifest injustice is synonymous with the plain error standard. . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)). But if the defendant invited the error, we will not review the error for manifest injustice. See State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 14, 128 P.3d 1171.
¶ 6 Defendant also argues that the trial court plainly erred when it submitted the charges to the jury because "there was insufficient evidence to establish that [Defendant] filed a wrongful lien as it relates to Judge Davis, and there was insufficient evidence that [Defendant] committed four separate acts of filing a wrongful lien." "To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient, Defendant must first `marshal the evidence in support of the verdict.'" State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ¶ 17, 196 P.3d 124 (citation omitted).
State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 15, 63 P.3d 94.
¶ 7 Jury instruction number 34 stated, "The document entitled `Administrative Judgment' recorded on November 15, 2004 in the office of the Utah County Recorder against Lynn W. Davis is a wrongful lien under Title 38 Chapter of the Utah Code." Defendant argues on appeal that the jury instruction violated his constitutional rights to have a jury determine the facts supporting the elements of his crime. However, Defendant did not argue this issue to the trial court. In fact, when the trial court specifically asked whether Defendant had any objections to the jury instructions numbered 28 to 34, Defendant responded, "No, your Honor." The State argues that Defendant invited any error by his affirmative representation. We agree.
¶ 8 "Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order to preserve an issue for appeal." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 11, 10 P.3d 346 (omission and first and second alterations in original) (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states, "Unless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R.Crim. P. 19(e). "[I]n most circumstances the term manifest injustice is synonymous with the plain error standard.. . ." Casey, 2003 UT 55, ¶ 40, 82 P.3d 1106 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1226 (Utah 1998) ("When reviewing a claim for manifest injustice, we generally use the same standard that is applied to determine whether plain error exists. . . . That standard is two-pronged. First, the error must be obvious. Second, the error must be of sufficient magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
¶ 9 "But under the doctrine of invited error, [the Utah Supreme Court] ha[s] declined to engage in even plain error review when counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 14, 128 P.3d 1171 (third and fourth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 742 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ¶ 12, 236 P.3d 155 (determining that the defendant invited any error in the jury instructions when, in response to the court's question, defense counsel affirmatively approved the jury instructions, but then on appeal, attempted to argue the jury instructions contained an error), cert. denied, 247 P.3d 774 (Utah 2011).
¶ 10 "Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 16, 128 P.3d 1171. Examples of affirmative representations include "where counsel stipulates to the court's instruction, states directly that there is no objection to a specific ruling of the court, or provides the court with erroneous authority upon which the court relies." Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ¶ 23, 164 P.3d 366; see also id. ¶¶ 19-23 (discussing criminal cases involving invited error to determine that an untimely filed memorandum that was stricken did not invoke the invited error doctrine); Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 10, 86 P.3d 742 (The supreme court "ha[s] recognized a number of ways in which a defendant has led a trial court into committing error. In [State v.] Hamilton, [2003 UT 22, 70 P.3d 111,] for instance, a defendant invited error where his counsel confirmed on the record that the defense had no objection to the instruction given by the trial court. Id. . . . ¶ 55. In [State v.] Anderson, [929 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1996),] a defendant likewise invited error when he failed to object to an instruction when specifically queried by the court. 929 P.2d at 1108-09. Finally, in State v. Medina, a defendant invited error when his counsel actively represented to the trial court that she had read the instruction and had no objection to it. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).").
¶ 11 Because Defendant affirmatively represented that he did not object to jury instruction number 34, the invited error doctrine applies. See Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 742. Defendant contends that his pro se status should preclude the application of the invited error doctrine. There are several reasons, however, why the invited error doctrine applies to Defendant.
¶ 12 First, the general purpose of the invited error doctrine supports its application to a pro se defendant. "While the invited error doctrine is crafted to discourage[] parties from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal, it is also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity to address the claim of error." Id. ¶ 12 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. ¶¶ 8, 12 (rejecting the defendant's argument that invited error required the defendant to be "engaged in a conscious and affirmative act that led the trial court to commit the instructional error"). "Encouraging counsel to actively participate in all proceedings and to raise any possible error at the time of its occurrence fortifies our long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to address a claim of error." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 15, 128 P.3d 1171 (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶ 13 Second, our general approach to pro se defendants supports the application of the invited error doctrine in such cases. A criminal defendant is clearly entitled to waive his constitutional right to legal counsel and to represent him or herself. See State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ¶¶ 26, 28, 137 P.3d 716 (determining that a criminal defendant can waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial, and explaining that one way to assert that right is by waiver, which "typically occurs when a defendant affirmatively requests permission to proceed pro se"); State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, ¶ 83, 63 P.3d 731 ("`An individual's constitutional right to represent himself is one of great weight and considerable importance in our criminal justice system.'" (citation omitted)). "Before permitting a defendant to do so, however, a trial court should ensure that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. A defendant
¶ 14 Defendant has not argued on appeal that his decision to proceed pro se was anything other than a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his right to legal counsel. Prior to trial, the trial court continually warned Defendant of the risks of proceeding pro se.
¶ 15 Additionally,
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ¶ 19, 128 P.3d 1171 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant quoted in his brief only the last sentence of the language from Winfield, which is fully quoted above. Defendant thus disregarded the responsibilities he had as a self-represented party and, moreover, failed to specifically identify any particular consideration in which the trial court should have indulged him but did not.
¶ 16 Third, as the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Winfield, the invited error doctrine applies to a pro se, criminal defendant who "appear[s] to have a reasonable knowledge of his rights and of trial procedure." See id. ¶ 20. Defendant tries to distinguish his case from Winfield by arguing he did not have the same legal experience as the defendant in Winfield. While it is true that Defendant had not previously defended himself in another trial as the defendant in Winfield had, we conclude that Defendant "appeared to have a reasonable knowledge of his rights and of trial procedure." See id.
¶ 17 As evidence that Defendant had "reasonable knowledge of his rights," see id., the record reveals that Defendant argued at trial that he "proclaims the principles found in th[e constitution] and works for their preservation." Furthermore, he made arguments concerning his constitutional rights and even specifically asserted that "the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact[s]." Despite his assertions of legal knowledge, Defendant now claims that as a pro se defendant he could not "comprehend these jury instructions, with all their legalese," in order to object or make a conscious decision not to object. While we acknowledge that constitutional and legal issues may be difficult for a pro se defendant to understand, jury instructions are generally written so that a juror, who may not have any legal training, can understand and apply the legal propositions contained within them. In particular, the jury instruction that Defendant now alleges violated his constitutional rights was straightforward and did not state a complex legal principle, but merely
¶ 18 Defendant also "ha[d] a reasonable knowledge . . . of trial procedure," see id. Throughout the trial and specifically in regard to the jury instructions, the trial court explained the trial procedure to Defendant. The trial court also gave Defendant a specific opportunity to object to the jury instructions numbered 28 to 34. Additionally, Defendant displayed some knowledge of general trial procedures by filing motions, objecting to the proceedings, reserving the right to make an opening statement until after the State rested, cross-examining witnesses, moving to dismiss at the close of the State's case, and making a closing argument. Therefore, because Defendant "appeared to have a reasonable knowledge of his rights and of trial procedure," see id., we cannot say that his pro se status relieved him of the duty to object to this jury instruction in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
¶ 19 Furthermore, Defendant suggests that the invited error doctrine is not applicable in this case because State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 992 P.2d 951, imposes a duty on the prosecutor to ensure a fair trial. However, Saunders addressed prosecutorial misconduct, see id. ¶ 31, and Defendant has made no claim of misconduct against the prosecutor for proposing jury instruction number 34. Moreover, Saunders itself, in discussing a prosecutorial misconduct claim, recognized the application of the invited error doctrine by stating "that an appellate court will review an allegation of plain error despite the lack of a timely objection if the trial court was not led into error." See id. ¶ 30.
¶ 20 Therefore, because we conclude that Defendant invited any error regarding the jury instructions, we are foreclosed from reviewing the merits of the jury instruction issue. See State v. Harper, 2006 UT App 178, ¶ 12, 136 P.3d 1261 (refusing to review the error under plain error or manifest injustice when "defense counsel invited the alleged error" by stating "he had no objections" to the jury instructions).
¶ 21 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it submitted the charges to the jury because "there was insufficient evidence to establish that [Defendant] filed a wrongful lien as it relates to Judge Davis, and there was insufficient evidence that [Defendant] committed four separate acts of filing a wrongful lien." We will address each in turn.
¶ 22 Defendant argues that it should have been obvious to the trial court that there was insufficient evidence
State v. Hodge, 2008 UT App 409, ¶ 17, 196 P.3d 124 (emphasis and alteration in original) (additional citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct.App.1991)); see also State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, ¶ 14, 989 P.2d 1065 ("`To demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support [a] jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991))).
¶ 23 Although Defendant argues that the Administrative Judgment itself did not identify Judge Davis's real property, Defendant overlooks, and therefore has failed to marshal, ample evidence presented at trial that supports that the Administrative Judgment "purport[ed] to create a lien or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property," see Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). In other words, testimony was given that the document itself created a wrongful lien against Judge Davis's property without specific reference to Judge Davis's private address. Judge Davis testified to the circumstances surrounding Judge Quinn's determination that the Administrative Judgment created a wrongful lien against Judge Davis's property. In fact, Judge Davis answered a juror's question regarding Judge Quinn's determination that the Administrative Judgment was a wrongful lien. Additionally, on cross-examination Judge Davis testified that he was injured because "any lien placed upon my home and my wife's home impairs my ability to borrow" and if he had attempted to purchase a vehicle or another home "this would have come up, I guarantee you, and they would have said, `What about this $4.2 million administrative judgment lien, and how are you going to pay that off?'" Judge Davis also responded to Defendant's question about "where in the document [is] the certain real property you own . . . named or described," by stating that his property is "[n]ot named, nor is it described as far as I know. . . . But if a judgment is entered against someone, it doesn't have to describe by me[te]s or bounds or by legal description one's property to in fact be a lien on one's property."
¶ 24 Even assuming these statements were factually or legally inaccurate or were incorrectly admitted, Defendant did not object or
¶ 25 Next, Defendant argues that because he caused only one document to be filed, he should have been charged, at most, with one count of filing a wrongful lien. Although Defendant classifies this as an insufficient evidence claim, what he really challenges is whether the wrongful lien statute supports four convictions when Defendant filed only one document.
¶ 26 Defendant has not indicated where in the record he raised this issue before the trial court so as to properly preserve it for appeal, see Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), but instead, asserts that "the trial court plainly erred by not dismissing the other three counts." Consequently, Defendant must establish the elements of plain error.
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ¶ 13, 10 P.3d 346 (alteration in original) (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1206).
¶ 27 Whether filing one document that affects several people and each of their interests in their property is one count of filing a wrongful lien, or whether the number of counts is determined by the number of people or properties listed, involves a question of statutory interpretation, which would require us to examine the interests the legislature intended the statute to protect.
¶ 28 Because Defendant affirmatively represented that he had no objection to jury instruction number 34, he invited the error that he now attempts to establish on appeal. His pro se status does not affect this outcome. Furthermore, Defendant has not established that the trial court plainly erred in either submitting the wrongful lien count related to Judge Davis to the jury or sending four separate wrongful lien counts to the jury.
¶ 29 Affirmed.
¶ 30 WE CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME and STEPHEN L. ROTH, Judges.
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-5(2) (2001). A wrongful lien is defined as
Id. § 38-9-1(6)(a)-(c).